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THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: 
PROSECUTE CORRUPTION AND END 
TRANSNATIONAL ILLEGAL LOGGING 
SARAH M. GORDON* 
Abstract: Transnational illegal logging, especially logging of protected spe-
cies within protected areas, causes many irreparable harms, including decreas-
ing biodiversity, increasing carbon emissions, deforestation, and economic 
and social harms to the communities where the illegal logging occurs. The 
United States is one of the world’s largest consumers of wood products and 
thus drives the illegal logging industry far beyond our borders. Illegal logging 
is facilitated by corruption and bribery within many contexts, including bribes 
from those engaged in illegal logging to police, officials, regulators, and cus-
toms and export officials who are entrusted with the task of preventing illegal 
logging. No existing methods have succeeded in combating the flow of ille-
gally harvested timber into the United States timber market. This Note sug-
gests that the recently amended Lacey Act, which is intended to be used in il-
legal logging prosecutions, is not suited for this purpose, as its terms have 
been interpreted and defined through years of litigation in the wildlife traffick-
ing context. This Note argues that the Department of Justice should begin us-
ing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’s (“FCPA”) anti-bribery provisions as 
an alternative method to prosecute those engaged in illegal logging. The ex-
pansively drafted FCPA is the perfect tool, as it can be applied to a wide range 
of actors and conduct that facilitates illegal logging. 
INTRODUCTION 
A bigleaf mahogany tree can live for 200 years or more, growing more 
than 150 feet tall and six feet wide.1 Mahogany trees produce dense, durable 
wood with reddish hues, highly valued as timber.2 The timber from a single 
tree can be worth more than $100,000 once constructed into luxury furni-
ture and other wood products.3 Mahogany is a slow-growth species, mean-
ing that it is very slow to regenerate after depletion from logging.4 These 
                                                                                                                           
 * Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2015–2016. 
 1 Ani Youatt & Thomas Cmar, The Fight for Red Gold: Ending Illegal Mahogany Trade from 
Peru, 23 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 19, 19 (2009). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
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trees play a critical role in the ecosystems where they grow.5 As a canopy 
species, mahogany trees provide a habitat and offer a source of food for a 
variety of animals and insects.6 Mahogany was once widespread, and could 
be found from Mexico through the Amazon; now it has been depleted 
throughout Central America, and can only be found in small areas in Brazil, 
Bolivia, and Peru.7 
In a May 2012 report, the Environmental Investigation Agency 
(“EIA”)8 documented how widespread and pervasive corruption facilitates 
illegal logging in Peru, leading to a flow of illegal timber from the Peruvian 
Amazon to importers in the United States.9 The illegal logging in Peru, de-
scribed in EIA’s 2012 report, took place when logging companies harvested 
trees from inside protected regions of the Amazon.10 The logging companies 
then forged false documents to move the trees through customs.11 Forest 
owners frequently submitted plans to legally harvest trees from non-
protected areas, and then the illegally harvested trees were exported under 
these falsified plans.12  
According to the EIA report, at least twenty-two United States compa-
nies have imported illegal wood from Peru.13 A Peruvian mahogany tree, 
illegally imported, can sell for $11,000 in the United States.14 As the growth 
of illegal logging operations has outpaced legal logging operations in Peru, 
legal loggers have found themselves unable to compete.15 Both the rapid 
depletion of the world’s mahogany stocks and the legal hurdles that make 
confronting illegal logging difficult are well-recognized, longstanding chal-
lenges.16 
                                                                                                                           
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 About EIA, ENVTL. INVESTIGATION AGENCY, http://eia-global.org/about-eia/ [http://perma.
cc/CB3T-8ZYY]. The EIA is an environmental non-governmental agency that “seeks to transform 
international trade and supply chains to protect Earth’s natural heritage.” Id. 
 9 JULIA M. URRUNAGA ET AL., ENVTL. INVESTIGATION AGENCY, THE LAUNDERING MACHINE: 
HOW FRAUD AND CORRUPTION IN PERU’S CONCESSION SYSTEM ARE DESTROYING THE FUTURE OF 
ITS FORESTS 4 (2012), http://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/The-Laundering-Machine.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/4NC6-LELX]. 
 10 Id. at 6–8; Illegal Wood from the Peruvian Amazon Is Entering the USA, ENVTL. INVESTI-
GATION AGENCY (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.eia-international.org/illegal-wood-from-peruvian-
amazon-is-entering-the-usa [http://perma.cc/JJU5-MYQW]. 
 11 URRUNAGA ET AL., supra note 9, at 4; Illegal Wood from the Peruvian Amazon Is Entering 
the USA, supra note 10. 
 12 Illegal Wood from the Peruvian Amazon Is Entering the USA, supra note 10. 
 13 URRUNAGA ET AL., supra note 9, at 31. 
 14 Id. at 3–4. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See generally Tyler Roozen, A Case of Need: The Struggle to Protect Bigleaf Mahogany, 
38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 603 (1998) (discussing the depletion of the world’s mahogany stocks in 
1998 and the legal hurdles to combating illegal logging). 
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By 2004, Peru had become the world’s leading exporter of mahogany; 
between 2004 and 2007, it was exporting more than eighty percent of its 
harvest to the United States.17 Peru’s mahogany stocks were decimated; il-
legal loggers increasingly entered protected areas, searching for the last of 
the mahogany trees.18 This search for mahogany trees harmed wildlife pop-
ulations and threatened the survival of the last few hundred indigenous peo-
ples living near the remaining mahogany trees.19 In 2006, the World Bank 
estimated that illegal logging in Peru generated between $44.5 and $72 mil-
lion annually for illegal loggers, compared to the $31.7 million generated 
by legal timber sales that contribute to Peru’s economy.20 
The United States timber industry is an active participant in the 
worldwide illegal logging industry.21 The United States is the world’s larg-
est consumer of wood products and as such is a driving force of illegal log-
ging beyond our borders.22 Illegal logging can include: logging timber spe-
cies protected by domestic law; logging outside of concession boundaries; 
logging on public lands and protected areas such as national parks or forest 
reserves; logging in prohibited areas such as steep slopes and river banks; 
taking more timber than authorized; logging without authorization; logging 
in breach of contractual obligations; and obtaining logging concessions ille-
gally.23  
Illegal logging has both economic and social costs to the countries 
where it takes place.24 It also threatens biodiversity, increases carbon emis-
sions, and causes landslides and other natural disasters.25 Deforestation, 
caused in part by illegal logging, accounts for almost twenty percent of all 
greenhouse gas emissions into the Earth’s atmosphere, and is thus a leading 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Youatt & Cmar, supra note 1, at 19. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. Illegal logging causes conflict between the illegal loggers and the indigenous people 
who reside in the Peruvian Amazon. MARIANA ARAUJO, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS, 
THE ASHÁNINKA: ILLEGAL LOGGING THREATENING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE PERUVIAN AMAZON 1–4 (2005), http://www.coha.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/09/The-Ashaninka-Illegal-logging-in-the-Peruvian-Amazon.pdf [http://perma.cc/ES9L-YQ4L]. 
Illegal logging can harm indigenous peoples in many ways, including destroying the land the 
indigenous people need for survival and interfering with their longstanding cultural practices. See 
id. 
 20 URRUNAGA ET AL., supra note 9, at 4. 
 21 Youatt & Cmar, supra note 1, at 19. 
 22 Id. 
 23 DEBRA J. CALLISTER, CORRUPT AND ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES IN THE FOREST SECTOR: CURRENT 
UNDERSTANDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WORLD BANK 7 (1999), http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/EXTFORESTS/Resources/985784-1217874560960/Callister.pdf [http://perma.cc/
MJU8-YJPK]. 
 24 URRUNAGA ET AL., supra note 9, at 4. 
 25 Id. 
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cause of global warming.26 Illegal logging causes special harms to indige-
nous populations that are frequently in more immediate proximity to the 
illegal logging activity, and in some instances, violent conflicts between 
indigenous communities and illegal loggers have been reported.27 It has also 
been used to fund wars.28 For example, illegal logging was a primary source 
of funding for the civil war in Liberia, initiated by Charles Taylor, now a 
convicted war criminal.29 
There is a strong connection between corruption, bribery, and envi-
ronmental crimes, including illegal logging.30 The potential bribe takers in 
the environmental context are almost boundless, and include police, offi-
cials, guards, regulators, customs and export officials, and even employees 
of state-owned companies.31 There is a profound and well-documented link 
between corruption and illegal logging.32 Examples of “grand”33 corruption 
in the forest sector include companies bribing politicians, other senior gov-
ernment officials, or senior military officers to: obtain a timber concession 
or extend an existing concession; approve a timber processing venture; or 
avoid payment of fines or other fees.34 Examples of “petty” corruption in 
the forest sector include bribing low-level government officials, members of 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See Illegal Logging in Indonesia: The Link Between Forest Crime and Corruption, U.N. 
OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME (June 1, 2010), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2010/June/
illegal-logging-in-indonesia-the-link-between-forest-crime-and-corruption.html [http://perma.cc/
6MD8-YTAG]. One expert has noted that, “[I]llegal deforestation can hinder carbon capture and 
climate change mitigation efforts.” Ibrahim Thiaw, The Critical Link Between Resource Plunder and 
Illegal Trade in Wildlife, U.N. AFR. RENEWAL, http://www.un.org/africarenewal/web-features/
critical-link-between-resource-plunder-and-illegal-trade-wildlife [http://perma.cc/3RFT-MX2Y]. 
 27 See, e.g., URRUNAGA ET AL., supra note 9, at 4; Marla Kerr, Note, Ecotourism: Alleviating 
the Negative Effects of Deforestation on Indigenous Peoples in Latin America, 14 COLO. J. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 335, 348–53 (2003); Alyssa A. Vegter, Comment, Forsaking the Forests for 
the Trees: Forestry Law in Papua New Guinea Inhibits Indigenous Customary Ownership, 14 
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 545, 554 (2005). 
 28 See, e.g., JOHN WOODS ET AL., FOREST TRENDS, INVESTMENT IN THE LIBERIAN FOREST 
SECTOR: A ROAD MAP TO LEGAL FOREST OPERATIONS IN LIBERIA 1 (2008), http://www.forest-
trends.org/documents/files/doc_1320.pdf [http://perma.cc/854F-SYF8]. 
 29 Id. at 1–2; Rudy S. Salo, Note, When the Logs Roll Over: The Need for an International 
Convention Criminalizing Involvement in the Global Illegal Timber Trade, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. 
L. REV. 127, 132–34 (2003). 
 30 Marcus Asner et al., The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Overseas Environmental 
Crimes: How Did We Get Here and What Happens Next?, DAILY ENV’T. REP., July 12, 2012, at 
B-1 to B-2. 
 31 See id. at B-3. 
 32 See id. at B-2. See generally CALLISTER, supra note 23 (identifying corrupt activities in the 
forest sector and their impact). 
 33 CALLISTER, supra note 23, at 9–10. Distinctions between “grand” and “petty” corruption 
are used by some scholars, and may be helpful to understand that corruption can take many forms 
from attempts to use bribery to change laws and policy, to bribing a forest official to ignore docu-
mentation irregularities. Id. 
 34 Id. 
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local government, or military personnel to: falsify documents as to the 
amount or species of trees harvested; avoid reporting illegal harvesting; fal-
sify export documents; or ignore illegal logging or other violations of forest 
management policy.35  
Corruption flourishes in the forest sector and illegal logging industry 
for a number of reasons.36 Forest regions tend to be sparsely populated and 
remote, allowing illegal activity to go undetected by the public or media.37 
Moreover, logs are essentially fungible commodities, making it difficult for 
a cursory inspection to distinguish between legally and illegally harvested 
timber.38 
The United States uses a variety of tools to protect forests and prevent 
illegal logging, including the Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”)39 and the Lacey Act.40 
Despite these strategies and other efforts to combat illegal logging, it re-
mains a serious problem.41 In 2012, the World Bank released a report rec-
ommending an increased use of the criminal justice system to combat ille-
gal logging.42 The report characterized existent use of the criminal justice 
system for this purpose as “sporadic,” “limited,” and “ineffective.”43 One of 
the report’s central recommendations is that the criminal justice system be 
used to “attack corruption” by prosecuting those who give and receive 
bribes to facilitate illegal logging.44 
Part I of this Note examines the current state of transnational illegal 
logging, with particular focus on the weaknesses of statutes currently used 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Id. 
 36 Arnoldo Contreras-Hermosilla, Law Compliance in the Forestry Sector: An Overview 10–
11 (World Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 37205, 2002), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/
Resources/wbi37205.pdf [http://perma.cc/TXT6-GBFG]. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Michael L. Brown, Note, Limiting Corrupt Incentives in a Global REDD Regime, 37 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 237, 254 (2010). 
 39 See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087 [hereinafter CITES]. CITES is implemented domestically by the 
Endangered Species Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(4) (2012) (defining “Convention” as used in the En-
dangered Species Act as “the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora”); id. § 1538(c)(1) (providing that “[i]t is unlawful for any person subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States to engage in any trade in any specimens contrary to the provisions 
of the Convention, or to possess any specimens traded contrary to the provisions of the Conven-
tion, including the definitions of terms in article I thereof”). 
 40 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378. 
 41 See MARILYNE PEREIRA GONCALVES ET AL., WORLD BANK, JUSTICE FOR FORESTS: IMPROV-
ING CRIMINAL JUSTICE EFFORTS TO COMBAT ILLEGAL LOGGING, at vii–viii (2012), http://site
resources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/Illegal_Logging.pdf [http://perma.
cc/ZE3E-78WX]. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at ix. 
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to prosecute illegal logging.45 It introduces the Lacey Act and describes how 
the scope of the Act has expanded over the last century, most recently to 
include timber.46 It examines the evolving negligence mens rea requirement 
of the Lacey Act and suggests that a stricter standard may be required to 
disrupt the illegal logging cycle that has engulfed the United States timber 
industry.47 Finally, Part I analyzes other attempts to prosecute illegal log-
ging and suggests that they demonstrate the difficulty of successful prosecu-
tions using the current methods.48 Part II of this Note introduces the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) and analyzes its anti-bribery statutory pro-
visions.49 Part II then analyzes the recent escalation of FCPA prosecutions, a 
trend that some commentators have suggested is moving closer to a strict 
liability standard.50 Finally, Part III of this Note proposes that the FCPA is 
the best method for disabling the illegal logging sector due to its expansive 
reach and the ease with which prosecutors could prove an FCPA violation in 
many illegal logging transactions.51 
I. EXISTING TOOLS USED TO PROSECUTE ILLEGAL LOGGING  
AND THEIR WEAKNESSES 
The Lacey Act is a federal statute that prohibits interstate and interna-
tional trafficking in protected wildlife and timber.52 The Act’s mens rea re-
quirement has evolved over time, most recently to a two-tier standard re-
quiring “knowing” violations for a felony charge and violations of “due 
care” for a misdemeanor charge.53 In its current form, the Act has resulted 
in only a small number of prosecutions for trafficking in illegally harvested 
timber.54 Prosecutions under the Lacey Act require substantial factual find-
ings, which may be difficult to prove in timber cases.55 This is due to the 
length of timber supply chains as compared to supply chains in wildlife traf-
ficking, and the difficulty inspectors have in definitively identifying illegal 
timber as compared to the ease of identifying illegally trafficked wildlife at 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See infra notes 52–132 and accompanying text. 
 46 See infra notes 59–102 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra notes 59–102 and accompanying text. 
 48 See infra notes 103–132 and accompanying text. 
 49 See infra notes 133–225 and accompanying text. 
 50 See infra notes 133–225 and accompanying text. 
 51 See infra notes 226–301 and accompanying text. 
 52 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378 (2012); infra notes 59–132 and accompanying text. 
 53 See Robert S. Anderson, The Lacey Act: America’s Premier Weapon in the Fight Against 
Unlawful Wildlife Trafficking, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 27, 36 (1995) (describing the evolution of 
the Lacy Act’s mens rea requirement); infra notes 59–132 and accompanying text. 
 54 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378; infra notes 59–132 and accompanying text. 
 55 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378; infra notes 59–132 and accompanying text. 
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inspection points.56 It is also unclear how the Lacey Act’s “due care” stand-
ard would be effectively applied to illegal timber trafficking.57 Other at-
tempts to stem the flow of illegal logging in the United States have also 
failed to stem the flow of illegally harvested timber into the country.58 
A. The Lacey Act 
1. The Expanding Scope of the Lacey Act and the Act’s Negligence Mens 
Rea Requirement 
The Lacey Act of 1900, introduced by Iowa Congressman John 
Lacey,59 was originally passed with the intent to preserve endangered ani-
mals and wild birds by making it a federal crime to illegally hunt game in 
one state, and then profit from its sale in another state.60 Though the Act 
extended to some other animals, it was primarily intended to preserve and 
restore bird populations and eradicate invasive species, the particular pas-
sion of Congressman Lacey.61 Over its history, the Lacey Act’s scope and 
attendant penalties have been significantly expanded.62 At present, the Act 
prohibits interstate and international trafficking in protected wildlife and 
timber.63 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See infra notes 59–132 and accompanying text. 
 57 See 16 U.S.C. § 3373(d); infra notes 59–132 and accompanying text. 
 58 See infra notes 59–132 and accompanying text. 
 59 Anderson, supra note 53, at 36. 
 60 Lacey Act, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187, 188 (1900) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378); 
Enlarging the Powers of the Department of Agriculture, 33d Cong. 4871–74 (1900) (statement of 
Rep. John Lacey). 
 61 See Enlarging the Powers of the Department of Agriculture, supra note 60. 
 62 See generally Anderson, supra note 53 (providing history of the Lacey Act and how it has 
evolved over time, noting that it has become the “premier weapon” against wildlife trafficking). 
 63 16 U.S.C. § 3372. The act prohibits, in pertinent part: 
(a) Offenses other than marking offenses 
It is unlawful for any person— 
(1) to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase any fish or wildlife 
or plant taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any law, treaty, or regu-
lation of the United States or in violation of any Indian tribal law; 
(2) to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in interstate or for-
eign commerce— 
(A) any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any law 
or regulation of any State or in violation of any foreign law; 
(B) any plant taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any law or regula-
tion of any State . . .  
(3) within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States (as de-
fined in section 7 of Title 18)— 
(A) to possess any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation 
of any law or regulation of any State or in violation of any foreign law or Indian 
tribal law, or 
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The Act was first amended in 1935 to expand its reach slightly to any 
“person, firm, corporation or association” who violated its provisions and to 
apply to interstate shipments by any method, rather than only shipments 
made by common carrier.64 It was significantly amended in 1969 when it 
was revised to cover amphibians, reptiles, mollusks, and crustaceans.65 A 
criminal mens rea was established— “knowingly and willfully” —and civil 
penalties were expanded to apply to negligent violations, to those who 
knowingly violated the act, or who, through the “exercise of due care,” 
should have known they were violating the law.66 In 1981, the Act was 
amended again to keep pace with a “massive illegal trade in fish and wild-
life.”67 It was combined with the Black Bass Act, bringing fish under the 
purview of the Lacey Act.68 The maximum civil fine was raised to 
$10,000.69 The word “willfully” was removed from the language of the 
mens rea requirement, as Congress found that it had hampered enforce-
ment.70 At present, the Lacey Act creates two levels of criminality: anyone 
who violates the Act knowing their conduct is a violation of the law is guilty 
of a felony, and anyone who violates the Act and should have known their 
conduct was in violation of the law is guilty of a misdemeanor.71 
In 2001, in United States v. Santillan, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Lacey Act did not require the de-
fendant to have knowledge of the particular law violated, as long as the de-
fendant was aware of the unlawfulness of their conduct.72 In Santillan, the 
defendant was a tropical fish storeowner from Southern California.73 Cross-
ing back into the United States following a trip to Tijuana, the defendant 
claimed he had nothing to declare.74 In fact, he had ten baby parrots stuffed 
under his car seats.75 Defendant admitted to knowing that he was “not al-
                                                                                                                           
(B) to possess any plant . . . taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any 
law or regulation of any State . . . . 
Id. 
 64 Anderson, supra note 53, at 45–46. 
 65 See S. REP. NO. 91-526, at 1 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1413, 1413–16. 
 66 Id. at 12–14; see Anderson, supra note 53, at 36–53 (discussing the history of amendments 
to the Lacey Act and their impact). 
 67 S. REP. NO. 97-123, at 1 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1748, 1748. 
 68 See H.R. REP. NO. 97-276, at 30–33 (1981). 
 69 Lacey Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-79, § 4(a)(1), 95 Stat. 1073 (codified as amended in 16 
U.S.C. § 3373(a) (2012)). 
 70 Anderson, supra note 53, at 49; see H.R. REP. NO. 97-276, at 31–33 (letter of Donald Paul 
Hodel, Undersecretary of the Interior); S. REP. NO. 97-123, at 2, 10–11. 
 71 16 U.S.C. § 3373(d)(1)–(3); United States v. Place, 693 F.3d 219, 222–23 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 72 243 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 73 Id. at 1127. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
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lowed” to bring the birds into the United States, but assumed that it was a 
minor offense that would simply result in the birds being seized, if discov-
ered.76 The Santillan court affirmed the defendant’s conviction for Lacey 
Act violations, finding that the Lacey Act’s “knowingly” mens rea require-
ment was met when the importer was aware that the wildlife or animals im-
ported were “tainted by illegality.”77 The court held that the Lacey Act did 
not require knowledge of the particular law violated, as long as the defend-
ant was aware of the unlawfulness of his or her conduct.78 
The Santillan court held that merely importing illegal fish or wildlife is 
insufficient, that a defendant cannot be convicted of a Lacey Act violation if 
“there was illegality, unknown to the importer, associated with its taking.”79 
Thus, the Lacey Act does not impose strict liability for any violation, which 
the court explains is to protect “otherwise innocent conduct.”80 The correct 
application of the “knowingly” mens rea has proven to be a “vexatious 
problem” for courts.81 In United States v. Bronx Reptiles, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned the district court’s 
Lacey Act conviction of a corporate defendant for importing frogs in inhu-
mane or unhealthful conditions, finding that the defendant was unaware of 
the shipping environment.82 
In 2008, the Lacey Act—long the most powerful tool for the prosecu-
tion of fish and wildlife crimes83—was amended (the “2008 Amendments”) 
to cover a broad range of plants and plant products.84 Prior to the 2008 
Amendments, the Lacey Act only applied to plants that were indigenous to 
the United States and listed under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), on a 
state’s protected species list, or listed in one of the three appendices to 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 1129. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 United States v. Bronx Reptiles, Inc. (Bronx Reptiles II), 217 F.3d 82, 83 (2d Cir. 2000). 
The court addressed the question, “When a criminal statute renders unlawful an act “knowingly” 
undertaken by the defendant, what must the extent of the defendant’s knowledge be to permit 
conviction?” Id. 
 82 Id. at 83–84; United States v. Bronx Reptiles, Inc. (Bronx Reptiles I), 949 F. Supp. 1004, 
1013–14 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 26 F. Supp. 2d 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), rev’d, 217 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 
2000). The defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 42(c). Bronx Reptiles II, 217 F.3d at 83. 
 83 Anderson, supra note 53, at 85 (describing the tremendous importance of the Lacey Act in 
the fight against illegal wildlife trafficking). 
 84 Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, § 8204, 122 Stat. 1291, 
1291–93 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371(f), 3373(a), (d) (2012)); Elinor Colbourn & 
Thomas W. Swengle, The Lacey Act Amendments of 2008: Curbing International Trafficking in 
Illegal Timber, ST036 A.L.I. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 365, 368 (2012). 
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CITES.85 The 2008 Amendments expanded the reach of the Lacey Act to 
timber, including timber that was illegally harvested in its country of origin 
before export to the United States.86 It included raw timber and manufac-
tured or value-added products like furniture and musical instruments.87 The 
amended Lacey Act defines “plant” as any “wild member of the plant king-
dom, including roots, seeds, parts, or products thereof, and including trees 
from either natural or planted forest stands.”88 Despite the expansion of the 
Lacey Act to include timber, to date there have been few prosecutions under 
the amended statute, leading one commentator to observe: “[T]he current 
dormant status of the new authority suggests that the Act is not serving as a 
realistic enforcement mechanism.”89 
2. Applying the Lacey Act’s “Due Care” Standard to the Timber Industry 
The 2008 Lacey Act Amendments expanding the Act to include illegal-
ly harvested timber brought under its purview a considerable range of cor-
porate actors.90 The expanded scope of the Act is significant, as the United 
States is “the largest wood products consumer and one of the top importers 
of tropical hardwoods,” much of which comes from regions where illegal 
logging is known to be widespread.91 The Lacey Act requires a “knowingly” 
mens rea standard for a felony offense under the statute.92 The Act also pun-
ishes violators who fail to exercise “due care” in determining whether the 
products (i.e. illegally poached game or illegally harvested timber) in ques-
tion are legal, with a misdemeanor charge.93 The due care standard is in-
tended to incentivize timber importers to question the origins of their prod-
ucts, thus increasing diligence throughout the supply chain.94 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., LACEY ACT: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2013), http:// 
www.aphis.usda.gov/plant_health/lacey_act/downloads/faq.pdf [http://perma.cc/3688-KGXR]. 
 86 16 U.S.C. § 3371(f)(1) (defining plants to include trees); id. § 3372(a)(2)(B)(i) (prohibiting 
the taking of plants in violation of United States law or the law of foreign countries); Colbourn & 
Swengle, supra note 84, at 369. 
 87 16 U.S.C. § 3371(f); see Consensus Statement of Importers, Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions, and Domestic Producers on Lacey Act Clarifications (July 17, 2009), http://www.trout
mansandersnews.com/marcom/news/TS-Intl_Trade_2009-07-17.pdf [http://perma.cc/BQ46-69LW]. 
 88 16 U.S.C. § 3371(f). 
 89 Sean H. Waite, Note, Blood Forests: Post Lacey Act, Why Cohesive Global Governance Is 
Essential to Extinguish the Market for Illegally Harvested Timber, 2 SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L. 317, 
337 (2012). 
 90 Rachel Saltzman, Commentary, Establishing a “Due Care” Standard Under the Lacey Act 
Amendments of 2008, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1, 2 (2010), http://repository.law.
umich.edu/mlr_fi/vol109/iss1/1 [perma.cc/63MJ-CCXD]. 
 91 Id. 
 92 16 U.S.C. § 3373(d)(1). 
 93 Id. § 3373(d)(2)–(3). 
 94 Saltzman, supra note 90, at 2–3. 
2016] End Transnational Illegal Logging with the FCPA  121 
The precise meaning of “due care” within the timber industry context 
is not yet clear.95 According to the legislative history, the due care standard 
is intended to ensure that an importer must act with the care that “a reason-
ably prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstanc-
es.”96 Tracing the origins of illegally harvested timber back along the supply 
chain may prove to be a heavy financial and logistical burden to timber im-
porters.97 Given the expense of using existing technology and methodolo-
gies to accurately determine the origin of the timber, and the difficulty of 
determining the legal origin of the timber otherwise, it is unclear exactly 
what care a “reasonable” importer would take in verifying the origins of 
their timber.98 Unlike the ten baby parrots stuffed under car seats at issue in 
Santillan,99 timber is essentially a fungible commodity, and an importer 
could more easily claim to be unaware that the timber being imported is 
illegal in nature.100 Some commentators have argued that there is insuffi-
cient guidance to understand how “due care” will be measured in the timber 
industry context; Lacey Act prosecutions can be intensely fact specific, lim-
iting their precedential value, and judicial opinions analyzing the due care 
standard are scant.101 The lack of clarity in the due care standard could al-
low importers flexibility to argue that they acted with due care, and thus 
avoid prosecution for importing illegally harvested wood.102 
                                                                                                                           
 95 See id. 
 96 See S. REP. NO. 97-123, at 10–11 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1748, 1757–58. 
 97 See Galit A. Sarfaty, Shining Light on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J 419, 431 
(2015). See generally Andrea Migone & Michael Howlett, From Paper Trails to DNA Barcodes: 
Enhancing Traceability in Forest and Fishery Certification, 52 NAT. RESOURCES J. 421 (2012) 
(describing the current financial and logistical challenges in tracing illegally harvested hardwood 
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 98 See Migone & Howlett, supra note 97, at 423, 436; Saltzman, supra note 90, at 3. 
 99 See United States v. Santillan, 243 F.3d 1125, 1127 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 100 See Brown, supra note 38, at 254 (explaining that because timber is essentially a fungible 
commodity, it is “difficult to distinguish [between] legally and illegally harvested wood”). 
 101 Saltzman, supra note 90, at 3. But see Francis G. Tanczos, Note, A New Crime: Possession 
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549, 567–68 (2011) (noting the lack of clarity in the due care standard as it applies to the timber 
industry, but arguing that such ambiguity could lead to overcriminalization of innocent importa-
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 102 See Brown, supra note 38, at 254 (noting the challenge in distinguishing between legally 
and illegally harvested wood); Saltzman, supra note 90, at 3 (noting the ambiguity of the “due 
care” standard, as applied to timber importers); Tanczos, supra note 101, at 567 (noting that com-
pliance with a “due care” standard should allow an importer to avoid any adverse consequences or 
criminal prosecution); Waite, supra note 89, at 337 (noting the “dormant status” of the Lacey Act 
in regards to illegal timber harvesting prosecutions). 
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B. Other Attempts at Prosecuting Illegal Logging 
Despite the limited use of the Lacey Act to prosecute illegal logging,103 
those fighting illegal logging both domestically and internationally have 
attempted to use the United States court system to seek relief.104 Although 
few such cases have been won on the merits,105 there has been at least one 
success.106 The failure of existing United States laws to prevent the importa-
tion of illegal mahogany into the United States has become a popular sym-
bol of the evils of illegal logging, and the United States’ role as a top con-
sumer of timber.107 
In Native Federation of Madre De Dios River & Tributaries v. Bo-
zovich Timber Products, Inc., organizations representing an indigenous 
community in Peru brought a case in the United States Court of Internation-
al Trade (“CIT”) against United States companies that import timber from 
Peru and a number of United States government agencies.108 This case was 
brought under the section of the ESA that implements CITES domestical-
ly.109 Indigenous groups from Peru’s Madre de Dios region led the call for 
Peru and international communities to combat the scourge of illegal mahog-
any logging.110  
The Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”), a United States-
based environmental advocacy organization, spearheaded the effort to com-
bat illegal mahogany logging in the United States, focusing on the demand-
side of the supply chain.111 Peru lists bigleaf mahogany in Appendix III of 
CITES, triggering a number of requirements including a certificate of origin 
for all mahogany exports.112 Despite being listed under a CITES appendix, 
which is intended to stem the flow of illegal logging, illegal mahogany log-
                                                                                                                           
 103 See Waite, supra note 89, at 337 (noting the “dormant status” of the Lacey Act in regards 
to illegal timber harvesting prosecutions). 
 104 See infra notes 108–132 and accompanying text. 
 105 See, e.g., Native Fed’n of Madre De Dios River & Tributaries v. Bozovich Timber Prods., 
Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007) (example of case in which plaintiffs failed to 
obtain relief for a claim against United States importers, who allegedly imported illegal Peruvian 
Mahogany, and United States government agencies, for allegedly allowing the importers’ illegal 
conduct, due to lack of jurisdiction in the court where it was brought). 
 106 See Castlewood Prods., L.L.C. v. Norton (Castlewood Prods. II), 365 F.3d 1076, 1082 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (example of successful anti-illegal logging action by the United States govern-
ment, where an agency’s decision to impound illegally harvested Brazilian mahogany was up-
held). 
 107 See Youatt & Cmar, supra note 1, at 23. This failure helped to stimulate the 2008 amend-
ments to the Lacey Act, which expanded the Act to ban the importation of illegal timber and wood 
products. Id. 
 108 491 F. Supp. 2d at 1175–76. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Youatt & Cmar, supra note 1, at 19. 
 111 Id. at 20. 
 112 Id. 
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ging remained widespread.113 The NRDC argued that CITES required im-
porting countries, like the United States, to help ensure compliance, espe-
cially in the face of evidence showing Peru’s export certificates of origin 
were not validly issued.114 
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants had violated, and continued to vio-
late, Section 9(c) of the ESA, which implements CITES.115 CITES is an 
international treaty, signed by the United States and many other countries,116 
that places different levels of protection on species listed in one of its three 
appendices.117 A listing on one of the appendices triggers different levels of 
protection, different prohibitions, and different documentation require-
ments.118 Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant importers import bigleaf ma-
hogany from Peru without valid export permits, and that the United States 
government permits defendant importers’ illegal conduct.119 The case al-
lowed plaintiffs the opportunity to accuse United States importers of play-
ing a role in the illegal logging of Peruvian bigleaf mahogany.120 The case 
turned on a jurisdictional issue; the court granted the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss, finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, 
and thus did not reach the merits.121 Ultimately, this attempt to use the CIT 
to enforce the ESA failed to produce a legal result stemming the flow of 
illegal mahogany from Peru into the United States, although it did allow 
plaintiffs the chance to present compelling evidence indicating that much of 
the imported mahogany was illegal.122 
Prior to plaintiffs’ unsuccessful effort to prevent illegal mahogany traf-
ficking in Native Federation of Madre De Dios River & Tributaries, there 
had been one case in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia upheld the United States government’s decision to im-
pound illegally harvested Brazilian mahogany.123 In 2002, Castlewood 
Products L.L.C., alongside a coalition of lumber companies, filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking the release 
                                                                                                                           
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 21. 
 115 Native Fed’n of Madre De Dios River & Tributaries v. Bozovich Timber Prods., Inc., 491 
F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1175–76 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007); see CITES, supra note 39. 
 116 Member Countries, CITES, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/parties/index.php [http://perma.
cc/NH28-C5VJ] (providing information about member countries). 
 117 CITES, supra note 39, at 1090–96; United States v. Place, 693 F.3d 219, 222 (1st Cir. 
2012). 
 118 CITES, supra note 39, at 1090–96; Place, 693 F.3d at 222. 
 119 Native Fed’n of Madre De Dios River & Tributaries, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. 
 120 See id. at 1176–77. 
 121 Id. at 1185–86. 
 122 Youatt & Cmar, supra note 1, at 22. 
 123 See Native Fed’n of Madre De Dios River & Tributaries, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 1185–86; 
Castlewood Prods. II, 365 F.3d 1076, 1083–86 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
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of shipments of mahogany from Brazil that had been impounded by the An-
imal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”) of the United States 
Department of Agriculture.124 APHIS impounded the shipment after Brazil’s 
Management Authority provided information to the United States Depart-
ment of the Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service, indicating that the timber 
was not legally obtained.125 In Castlewood Products L.L.C. v. Norton, the 
plaintiffs argued that as the proper Brazilian authorities had signed the ex-
port documents, they were beyond the reach of United States law.126 
Unlike Native Federation of Madre De Dios River & Tributaries, Cas-
tlewood Products L.L.C. turned on the court’s application of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act,127 which provides that the court must determine whether 
the agency action was “arbitrary, capricious . . . or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law,” a highly deferential standard of review.128 The district court 
found for the defendant, holding that the agency’s actions in seizing the 
timber were not arbitrary and capricious.129 The Circuit Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia upheld the ruling.130 Although Castlewood Products 
L.L.C. represents a victory against illegal logging, it does not represent the 
triumph of an anti-illegal logging statute.131 Rather, it represents the judicial 
branch’s deference to an agency action, a risky proposition in the age of 
agency capture.132 
                                                                                                                           
 124 Castlewood Prods. v. Norton (Castlewood Prods. I), 264 F. Supp. 2d 9, 11–12 (D.D.C. 
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 125 Castlewood Prods. II, 365 F.3d at 1078. 
 126 Id. at 1083. 
 127 See Native Fed’n of Madre De Dios River & Tributaries, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 1185–86; 
Castlewood Prods. II, 365 F.3d at 1082. 
 128 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 129 Castlewood Prods. I, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 12–14. 
 130 Castlewood Prods. II, 365 F.3d at 1086. 
 131 See id. at 1082–83 (holding that the agency’s actions were permitted based on the applica-
tion of the Administrative Procedure Act, rather than an anti-illegal logging statute). 
 132 Peter H.A. Lehner, Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Inaction, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 
627, 676–77 (1983) (noting that if agencies have been “captured,” courts should use a less defer-
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rather than expertise in the area). See generally GARY LAWSON, Scope of Review of Agency Ac-
tion, in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (6th ed. 2012) (describing various standards of review 
for determining how much deference is given to agency decisions in different contexts, and the 
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II. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: ITS EXPANSIVE ANTI-BRIBERY 
PROVISIONS, EXPANDING SCOPE, AND AN INCREASING  
NUMBER OF PROSECUTIONS 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) was designed to combat 
global corruption and disincentivize United States corporations and busi-
nesses from engaging in bribery or corruption abroad.133 It was intentionally 
drafted broadly to encompass a wide range of corrupt conduct.134 There has 
been a recent increase in FCPA prosecutions, and an expansion of the reach 
of the Act’s anti-bribery provisions.135 The Act’s expansive reach makes it a 
powerful instrument to take action against criminal activity that would oth-
erwise be difficult to prosecute.136 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was passed in 1977, in the wake of 
the Watergate scandal.137 It was part of a wider anti-corruption movement 
that took place domestically following Watergate.138 The FCPA was passed 
following an investigation that showed massive and widespread bribery by 
United States interests abroad.139 Congress was especially concerned by the 
fact that United States defense contractors and oil companies had made 
large payments to government officials in Japan, the Netherlands, and Ita-
ly.140 These corrupt transactions posed three serious problems for the United 
States: undermining the economic interests of the countries where they oc-
curred; preserving the integrity of world markets and the public’s faith 
therein;141 and “causing foreign policy problems for the United States.”142 
The FCPA is generally seen as “a tool to combat global corruption . . . and 
counteract the incentives for United States companies to bribe foreign offi-
                                                                                                                           
 133 See infra notes 137–144 and accompanying text. 
 134 See infra notes 145–194 and accompanying text. 
 135 See infra notes 195–225 and accompanying text. 
 136 See infra notes 226–301 and accompanying text. 
 137 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as 
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 140 H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 5; S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 3–4. 
 141 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4–5; S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 3–4. 
 142 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 746 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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cials.”143 In addition to reducing the harm of corruption caused by United 
States companies abroad, the FCPA was also intended to “bolster the global 
image of the [United States]” and “strengthen [our] relationships with our 
allies.”144 
The FCPA of 1977 criminalizes the extraterritorial payment of bribes 
by domestic companies and their agents.145 It prohibits payments to foreign 
officials for purposes of: 
(i) [I]nfluencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his 
official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit 
to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or 
(iii) securing any improper advantage . . . in order to assist [the 
company making the payment] in obtaining or retaining business 
for or with, or directing business to, any person . . . .146  
The FCPA prohibits “use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce” in furtherance of the prohibited acts.147 Although the 
FCPA is a domestic criminal statute, its reach extends to any foreign com-
pany or individual, provided that some of the acts of bribery, or other acts in 
furtherance of them, take place in the United States.148 Thus, in addition to 
bribes between United States corporations and foreign government officials, 
bribes between foreign actors on foreign soil can be within the reach of the 
FCPA, if so much as an email, phone call, or use of a United States cell 
phone carrier was used in the transaction.149 FCPA violations can result in 
fines or incarceration.150 
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The FCPA anti-bribery provisions are comprised of three essential el-
ements: it prohibits giving “anything of value” to a “foreign official” for the 
purposes of “obtaining or retaining business.”151 
A. Meaning of “Foreign Official” Under the FCPA 
The FCPA prohibits payments to “foreign officials,” which it defines 
as: 
[A]ny officer or employee of a foreign government or any de-
partment, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public inter-
national organization, or any person acting in an official capacity 
for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, 
or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public interna-
tional organization.152  
It is not disputed that heads of state and state agents with an official title 
(Minister of Defense, Customs Enforcement Official, etc.) are foreign offi-
cials for the purposes of the FCPA.153 Beyond that, both the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have 
brought cases against employees of foreign companies.154 In the majority of 
FCPA enforcement actions in 2009, the “foreign officials” implicated were 
actually employees of state-owned enterprises or state-controlled enterpris-
es.155 This definition of “foreign official” is based on the theory that the 
state-owned or state-controlled enterprise is an “instrumentality” of the for-
eign government.156 The FCPA does not define the term “instrumentali-
ty.”157 
The most recent guidance on the meaning of “foreign official” under 
the FCPA is from a district court case, United States v. Aguilar.158 In Agui-
                                                                                                                           
Global Undercurrents: Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Transnational Orga-
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128 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 43:111 
lar, the government charged three defendants—two individuals and a Unit-
ed States company (collectively, “the Lindsey defendants”) with conspiracy 
to violate the FCPA and substantive violations of the FCPA.159 The Lindsey 
defendants were accused of paying bribes to two senior level employees of 
Comisión Federal de Electricidad (“CFE”), an electric utility company 
wholly owned by the Mexican government.160 The defendants did not dis-
pute that, under the Mexican Constitution, the government is solely respon-
sible for providing electricity.161 Instead, the defendants contended that, 
even accepting the government’s allegations regarding the FCPA violations 
as true, no state-owned corporation, as a matter of law, is an “instrumentali-
ty” of the state, and therefore no CFE employee could be a “foreign offi-
cial” under the FCPA.162 
In Aguilar, defendants made an “all or nothing” argument that state-
owned corporations could never be instrumentalities because not all state-
owned corporations shared characteristics with “departments” or “agen-
cies.”163 The United States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia rejected this argument, pointing out some of the many characteristics 
that can be true of “departments,” “agencies,” and state-owned corpora-
tions: 
[1] The entity provides a service to the citizens—indeed, in many 
cases to all the inhabitants—of the jurisdiction. [2] The key offic-
ers and directors of the entity are, or are appointed by, govern-
ment officials. [3] The entity is financed, at least in large measure, 
through governmental appropriations or through revenues ob-
tained as a result of government-mandated taxes, licenses, fees or 
royalties, such as entrance fees to a national park. [4] The entity is 
vested with and exercises exclusive or controlling power to ad-
minister its designated functions. [5] The entity is widely per-
ceived and understood to be performing official (i.e., governmen-
tal) functions.164  
The court held that the structure, object, and purpose of the FCPA are con-
sistent with a definition of instrumentality that includes at least some state-
owned corporations, including CFE, the corporation at issue in that case.165 
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This holding vastly expanded the possible foreign actors who could satisfy 
the “foreign official” element of the FCPA.166 
B. Meaning of “Obtaining or Retaining Business” —The Business-Nexus 
Requirement Under the FCPA 
As stated above, the FCPA prohibits offering or paying a foreign offi-
cial anything of value for the purposes of: 
(i) [I]nfluencing any act or decision of such foreign official . . . 
(ii) inducing such foreign official . . . to do or omit to do any act 
in violation of the lawful duty of such foreign official . . . or (iii) 
securing any improper advantage; or . . . inducing such foreign 
official . . . to use his . . . influence with a foreign government or 
instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision 
of such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such is-
suer in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing 
business to, any person.167 
In United States v. Kay, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit had the opportunity to resolve the interpretation of the so-called 
“business-nexus” element of the FCPA—the bribe must be meant to “assist 
in obtaining or retaining business.”168 The question at issue in Kay was 
whether illicit payments to foreign officials for the purpose of avoiding cus-
toms duties and sales taxes to obtain or retain business are the type of bribe 
the FCPA criminalizes.169 The court found that the language of the statute 
was ambiguous and proceeded to analyze the legislative history.170  
The defendant in Kay was David Kay, an American citizen and the 
vice-president of marketing for American Rice, Inc. (“ARI”).171 ARI is an 
American company that exports rice to foreign countries, including Haiti.172 
Rice Corporation of Haiti is a wholly-owned subsidiary of ARI, incorpo-
rated in Haiti to represent ARI’s interests there.173 As part of Haiti’s stand-
ard goods importation procedure, Haiti’s customs officials assess duties 
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based on the quantity and quality of the rice, as well as sales taxes.174 De-
fendants were two senior level officers of ARI.175 They were charged with 
FCPA violations for bribing Haitian customs officials to accept false bills of 
lading176 that understated the quantity of rice shipped to Haiti, thus reducing 
ARI’s customs duties and sales tax.177 Despite laying out in great detail the 
facts of the bribery scheme, the indictment in question only asserted that the 
bribes were meant to assist in “obtaining or retaining business” for ARI, 
without any further facts to support that assertion.178 
The defendants argued against a broad interpretation of the business-
nexus requirement, and contended that the bare assertion that the bribery 
scheme was meant to assist ARI in “obtaining or retaining business” did not 
fulfill this element of the alleged FCPA violation.179 The government argued 
that, as lowered tax and customs payments increase a company’s profit 
margin, they should automatically satisfy the business-nexus element.180 
The court accepted neither position.181 Instead, the court held that bribes 
intended to lower customs or sales tax payments could fall within the type 
of bribes Congress intended to criminalize with the FCPA, but that the nex-
us between these payments and the “obtaining or retaining business” had to 
be explicitly laid out in the indictment.182 
C. The “Grease Payments” Exception to the FCPA and Other Defenses 
Though Congress intended to criminalize bribery that assisted busi-
nesses in “obtaining or retaining business for or with . . . any person,”183 it 
did not intend to prohibit payments for routine governmental action, often 
referred to as “grease or facilitation payments.”184 The statute explicitly 
provides an exception for “any facilitating or expediting payment to a for-
eign official . . . the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the perfor-
mance of a routine governmental action by a foreign official . . . .” 185 The 
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term “routine governmental action” is further clarified by Section 78dd–
1(f)(3)(A), which provides examples of such actions, including: 
(i) [O]btaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to 
qualify a person to do business in a foreign country; (ii) pro-
cessing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders; (iii) 
providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or sched-
uling inspections associated with contract performance or inspec-
tions related to transit of goods across country; (iv) providing 
phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading 
cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities from de-
terioration; or (v) actions of a similar nature.186  
The legislative history of this section provides further insight into what ac-
tions may be permissible grease payments.187 For example, the report of the 
United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
indicates that grease payments might include “payments for expediting 
shipments through customs or placing a transatlantic telephone call, secur-
ing required permits, or obtaining adequate police protection, transactions 
which may involve even the proper performance of duties.”188 
In Kay, the Fifth Circuit characterized this exception as “narrowly 
drawn . . . carving out very limited categories of permissible payments from 
an otherwise broad statutory prohibition.”189 The Kay court analyzed the 
legislative history, and explained that Congress’s use of the “corruptly” 
mens rea standard was intended to punish bribes that persuaded a govern-
ment official to misuse their discretionary authority. 190 In contrast, the 
standard was not intended to punish payments made simply to hasten an 
action or decision that would have happened without the bribe.191 
The 1988 amendments to the FCPA provided defendants with two af-
firmative defenses.192 First, there was no violation of the FCPA if the pay-
ment in question was lawful under the written laws of the foreign coun-
try.193 Second, there was no violation if the exchange of “anything of value” 
was payment for a bone fide business expense, such as travel or lodging.194 
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D. The Exponential Increase in FCPA Enforcement Actions 
The SEC is responsible for the civil enforcement of the FCPA, includ-
ing its anti-bribery and books and records provisions.195 The DOJ is respon-
sible for all criminal enforcement of the statute, and the enforcement of the 
civil anti-bribery provisions against non-issuers.196 Between its passage in 
1977 and 2002, FCPA enforcement was minimal, with few cases being 
brought under the statute.197 Between 2002 and 2014, however, both civil 
and criminal enforcement actions increased exponentially.198 Many factors 
have contributed to this increase in enforcement, including: corporate scan-
dals such as Enron and WorldCom, enhanced scrutiny of international 
transactions under the United States Patriot Act, the rapid economic growth 
of China, and attendant increase of United States business in China.199 
The FCPA can serve as a powerful tool for a prosecutor, due to the fre-
quent use of the DOJ non-prosecution agreements (“NPAs”) and deferred 
prosecution agreements (“DPAs”), which, according to some commentators, 
have led to “virtually non-existent” judicial scrutiny of the government’s 
theories of FCPA violations.200 Use of NPAs and DPAs has “exploded in 
recent years.”201 The DOJ’s increased use of NPAs and DPAs is a further 
indication of the DOJ’s increasingly aggressive enforcement of the 
FCPA.202 NPAs are privately negotiated agreements between the DOJ and 
the defendant business entity without any judicial involvement.203 Similarly, 
DPAs are privately negotiated agreements in which the DOJ declines to 
pursue prosecution for a period of time (several years), and the corporate 
entity admits responsibility for the conduct being alleged.204 The key dis-
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tinction between NPAs and DPAs is that DPAs are filed with the court.205 
DPAs and NPAs allow the defendant to agree to follow compliance re-
quirements, usually including a fine, for a set period of time, in exchange 
for which the prosecutor will either defer or forgo prosecution. 206 By fore-
going legal action, the prosecution’s theory goes untested by judicial scruti-
ny.207 
E. Expansive Reach of the FCPA 
In 2012, the SEC brought a civil enforcement action against officers of 
an offshore drilling company that was operating in Nigerian waters, alleging 
violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.208 In Securities and Ex-
change Commission v. Jackson, the defendants were current and former 
employees of Noble Corporation (“Noble”).209 Noble is a provider of off-
shore drilling services and equipment.210 To legally operate drilling rigs off-
shore in Nigeria, the owner of the rig must pay permanent import duties or 
get a temporary import permit (“TIP”).211 TIPs allow the rigs to operate 
without paying import duties, and are by law permitted only for rigs that 
intend to be in the country for less than one year, with a limited number of 
extensions possible.212 The SEC alleged that Noble-Nigeria (a subsidiary of 
Noble) authorized a customs agent to pay bribes to Nigerian government 
officials to obtain the false documentation Noble-Nigeria needed to get 
TIPs, and thus avoid the payment of import duties.213 Defendants Jackson 
and Ruehlen, employees of Noble-Nigeria, approved numerous “special 
handling” and “procurement” payments to government officials to obtain 
the false paperwork.214 For this conduct, defendants were charged with vio-
lations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.215 
Defendants argued that the complaint failed to allege: (1) the involve-
ment of a “foreign official”; (2) that the payments were not “facilitation” 
(grease) payments; and (3) that the defendants had the requisite “corruptly” 
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mens rea.216 The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas analyzed the plain language of the statute and the legislative history, 
and found that “the language of the statute does not appear to require that 
the identity of the foreign official involved be pled with specificity.”217 Be-
cause the FCPA required that the “thing of value” be given for the purpose 
of influencing an official act or decision of the foreign official, the court 
explained that in some cases it may be necessary to plead details of the for-
eign official’s identity.218 
The Jackson court also provided instruction regarding the “knowingly” 
mens rea required by the statute.219 Analyzing the legislative history, the 
court found that Congress intended to prohibit actions taken with actual 
knowledge, as well as actions taken when there was evidence of “a con-
scious disregard or deliberate ignorance of known circumstances that 
should reasonably alert one to the high probability of violations of the 
Act.”220 
Under the FCPA, a parent company’s liability for a subsidiary compa-
ny that violated the anti-bribery provisions was originally based on the the-
ory that the subsidiary acted under the parent company’s authorization, di-
rection, or control.221 As the reach of the FCPA has continued to expand, the 
government has sought to hold parent companies liable for the actions of its 
subsidiaries without showing knowledge of or participation in the criminal 
conduct.222 The DOJ made this policy official in the November 2012 Re-
source Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, in which it asserted 
that a parent company may be liable under the FCPA’s anti-bribery provi-
sions “under traditional agency principles,” as well as when it was shown to 
participate in the illegal conduct.223 One commentator has suggested that 
this expanded parent company liability is part of “a steady progression to-
ward a strict liability FCPA regime.”224 Other scholars have commented 
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positively on the use of strict liability in the FCPA context, arguing that it is 
the best way to prevent corporate bribery, by shifting the risk of liability to 
those best able to prevent the conduct.225 
III. POTENTIAL USE OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT TO BREAK 
THE CYCLE OF ILLEGAL LOGGING 
Due to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’s (“FCPA”) expansive reach 
and undemanding mens rea requirement, it can be used effectively to mini-
mize the United States’ role in transnational illegal logging.226 Bribery and 
corruption in the illegal logging context could be prosecuted under the 
FCPA.227 At present, there are no reported cases in which the FCPA has 
been used to prosecute the importers of illegal timber.228 Looking to wildlife 
trafficking cases, however, provides two important insights.229 First, it high-
lights why the Lacey Act can be used successfully to prosecute wildlife traf-
ficking but not necessarily to prosecute actors engaged in the illegal timber 
trade.230 Second, it shows that many of the wildlife trafficking cases could 
have been brought under the FCPA instead of, or in addition to, the Lacey 
Act.231 Comparing the fact patterns of wildlife trafficking cases with what is 
known about the transnational illegal logging trade indicates that the FCPA 
can be a potent tool to fight illegal logging.232 The failures of previous at-
tempts to stem the flow of illegal logging in the United States, along with 
the profound and irreversible impacts of illegal logging, require the United 
States to harness untraditional methods to prosecute illegal logging.233 Now 
is the time to use the FCPA to begin a new era of illegal logging prosecu-
tions.234 
As early as 1999, well before the recent upswing in FCPA prosecu-
tions, commentators noted its potential use in combating illegal logging.235 
Given the nexus between bribery, corruption, and illegal logging, and the 
potential for FCPA violations in any environmental law case involving 
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Lacey Act violations and bribery of foreign officials, some scholars have 
suggested that the Department of Justice (DOJ) will begin prosecuting envi-
ronmental crimes, such as illegal logging, using the FCPA.236 Despite the 
argument that environmental crimes such as illegal logging depend on brib-
ery and corruption and thus inherently implicate the FCPA, there have been 
no prosecutions of such crimes under the FCPA to date.237 
A. Bribery in the Illegal Wildlife Trafficking Context Could Be Charged 
Under the FCPA 
Prosecutions under the Lacey Act and the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”) for wild-
life trafficking involving acts of bribery and corruption provide a useful 
example of conduct that could also be tried under the FCPA.238 Bribery is 
often part of schemes to illegally import wildlife.239 In United States v. Labs 
of Virginia, the defendant was a U.S.-based laboratory that bred and sold 
primates for medical research.240 Defendants sought to acquire a breeding 
colony of long-tail, crab-eating macaque monkeys from Inquatex, an Indo-
nesian company.241 Defendant Labs of Virginia and individual defendants 
David Taub, Charles Stern, and William Henley III, employees of the lab, 
were charged with violating several provisions of the Lacey Act, and sever-
al other import laws.242 Stern and Henley were also charged with illegal 
trafficking of species protected by Indonesian law.243 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied defendants’ motion to 
dismiss.244 The export of wild-caught macaque monkeys was illegal under 
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Indonesian law.245 An employee informed defendants that the export of the 
monkeys was illegal, and that the Indonesian company had “bribed gov-
ernment officials to obtain permits for their release.”246 The lab proceeded 
to complete the purchase and import the monkeys.247 
In United States v. Kum, another wildlife trafficking case involving 
bribery, there was evidence showing that the defendant bribed Thai gov-
ernment officials to facilitate the smuggling of “girls” and wildlife.248 De-
fendant was found to have violated CITES and other import laws.249 In 
Kum, the defendant was Leong Tian Kum, a Singaporean resident of Thai-
land.250 He was charged with smuggling and money laundering offenses for 
conspiring with others to illegally import protected wildlife into the United 
States from Thailand, in order to sell in the United States market.251 The 
defendant had acquired protected species of tortoises, turtles, and slow loris 
in order to sell them in the United States and Europe in the illegal pet 
trade.252 Several of the individuals who received these animals went on to 
resell them.253 The government introduced the defendant’s emails at trial, 
which showed that the defendant had bribed Thai officials to facilitate the 
smuggling.254 
In United States v. Bengis, the defendants were convicted of the illegal 
harvest of large quantities of rock lobsters in South Africa—intended for 
export to the United States—in violation of the South Africa Marine Living 
Resources Act and United States law.255 Between 1987 and 2001, Arnold 
Bengis, Jeffery Noll, and David Bengis led an “elaborate” scheme to illegal-
ly harvest large quantities of rock lobsters in South African waters for ex-
port to the United States, a scheme that violated both United States and 
South African law.256 Arnold Bengis was the Chairman of Hout Bay Fishing 
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Industries, a fishing company through which the defendants organized their 
lobster exportation scheme.257 The other two defendants, Jeffery Noll and 
David Bengis, were presidents of two United States corporations that im-
ported and distributed fish within the United States for Hout Bay.258 De-
fendants directed Hout Bay to harvest rock lobsters in amounts beyond the 
authorized quota.259 A South African court found that Hout Bay, the South 
African company that harvested the lobsters for the United States corpora-
tions, bribed a number of fisherman and fisheries inspectors in furtherance 
of the scheme.260 
In Bengis, all three defendants were indicted in the United States.261 
Arnold Bengis and Noll pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the Lacey 
Act and to commit smuggling in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and violations 
of the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A), and David Bengis pleaded 
guilty to the conspiracy charge.262 Despite the evidence of bribery and the 
finding of a violation of a foreign law, defendants were not charged under 
the FCPA.263 As an attorney who prosecuted Bengis has observed, although 
the defendants were not charged with FCPA violations, their conduct was 
sufficient to warrant such charges.264 
Bengis, Kum, and Labs of Virginia are examples of wildlife trafficking 
cases in which the defendants could have been charged with a violation of 
the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, which prohibits payments to for-
eign officials for purposes of: 
(i) [I]nfluencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his 
official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit 
to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or 
(iii) securing any improper advantage . . . in order to assist [the 
company making the payment] in obtaining or retaining business 
for or with, or directing business to, any person.265  
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The defendants in Bengis and Labs of Virginia could have been charged as 
issuers or domestic concerns.266 The defendant in Kum was arrested during 
a trip to the United States to arrange for the sale of wildlife.267 The defend-
ant, a Singaporean residing in Thailand, could have been charged under the 
territorial jurisdiction of the FCPA, which extends to foreign persons that 
engage in any act in furtherance of a corrupt payment while in the territory 
of the United States.268 In each case, the defendants either paid directly or 
were aware of a payment to a foreign official in order to influence an act of 
such official in their official capacity to secure an improper advantage, in 
order to obtain or retain business.269 
Although Labs of Virginia and Bengis provide examples of wildlife 
trafficking conduct that could be prosecuted under both the Lacey Act and 
the FCPA,270 the Lacey Act would most likely not be suitable for prosecu-
tion of similar conduct involving illegal logging and bribery, given the un-
certainty surrounding the Lacey Act’s “due care” standard as applied to the 
timber industry and the almost total absence of any such Lacey Act prosecu-
tions.271 The FCPA, however, could be used effectively to prosecute similar 
fact patterns involving bribery and smuggling in the illegal logging con-
text.272 
B. Examples of Bribery and Corruption in the Illegal Logging Sector 
A 2012 Environmental Investigation Agency (“EIA”) report provides a 
specific example of bribes being demanded for an official report reflecting 
favorably on a Peruvian logging operation.273 A 2007 Washington Post in-
vestigative report described bribes being paid to access teak in Burma, 
which was then illegally logged, exported, and ultimately ended up for sale 
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from United States retailers including Home Depot, Lowes, and IKEA.274 A 
2005 EIA report describes bribes being paid by illegal loggers in Honduras 
to flout local logging regulations.275 The report also details the bribes paid 
by a mahogany trafficker in Honduras.276 The report further describes how 
Caoba de Honduras, the largest exporter of mahogany in Honduras, partici-
pates in illegal logging.277 Caoba de Honduras manufactures and ships luxu-
ry hardwood furniture to many U.S. furniture companies, including Baker, 
Hickory, Lexington, and Century Furniture.278 Caoba de Honduras 
acknowledges that illegal logging is a significant challenge, stating, “Right 
now, it’s a problem . . . because all the laws here are not very good . . . in 
[the] forest [sector]; there is a lot of corruption.”279 At that time, the United 
States was the largest single consumer of Honduran wood products.280 Unit-
ed States distributors of Honduran timber products include Home Depot, K-
Mart, Ace Hardware, True Value Hardware, Macy’s Furniture Gallery, Ba-
bies “R” Us, LL Bean, Brookstone, Target, Sears, and Burlington Coat Fac-
tory.281 
Reports from around the world detail the relationship between bribery 
and illegal logging in many different countries.282 In Indonesia, one report 
suggests that bribes are used in a number of contexts, including: illegal log-
gers paying bribes to officials at timber checkpoints; illegal loggers paying 
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bribes to judges and prosecutors to avoid being charged with illegal logging 
crimes or for favorable judicial decisions; and bribes paid to government 
officers to get timber extraction licenses.283 A World Bank report from 
Mongolia describes in detail the use of bribes in many situations in the ille-
gal logging industry, including: to ensure selection for a logging license; 
purchase of a false certificate of origin for timber to be exported; arrange-
ment with a forest ranger to not observe illegal logging; to secure release if 
caught by a forest ranger; to pass through timber checkpoints; to obtain pa-
pers to pass through timber checkpoints; and to avoid being caught by tim-
ber inspectors.284 In Mongolia, such bribes are paid to many government 
officials, including the Ministry of Nature and the Environment, forest 
rangers, police officers, and timber inspectors.285 The United States imports 
wood from all around the world, including Indonesia,286 Malaysia,287 and 
Mongolia.288 As a leading importer of timber and wood products, the United 
States is an active participant in the transnational illegal logging industry.289 
C. Bribery in the Illegal Logging Context Could Be Charged Under the 
FCPA 
Just as the FCPA could be used to prosecute wildlife trafficking 
schemes involving bribery, it could also be used to prosecute illegal logging 
where United States corporations are part of the supply chain, the mens rea 
requirement is met, and a bribe is paid to a foreign official to influence a 
decision or action that would not otherwise have been taken.290 There is ev-
idence to suggest that United States companies are importing and distrib-
uting timber that may have been illegally logged or obtained through a 
transaction that included bribery.291  
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Companies such as Castlewood Products, L.L.C., Interforest Corp., M. 
Bohlke Veneer Corp., Marwood, Inc., United Veneer, L.L.C., Veneer Tech-
nologies, Inc., and Aljoma Lumber, Inc.—the plaintiffs in Castlewood 
L.L.C. v. Norton—were aware that the United States Department of Agricul-
ture and the Fish and Wildlife Service had seized their shipments of Brazili-
an bigleaf mahogany based on the belief that it had been illegally logged.292 
The plaintiff-importers disputed this characterization, arguing that the tim-
ber had valid foreign export permits.293 United States furniture retailers 
Baker, Hickory, Lexington, and Century Furniture import timber, including 
mahogany, from Caoba de Honduras, a Honduran timber exporter that has 
acknowledged the widespread and pervasive corruption in the forest sector 
from which it sources its wood.294 These United States importers and dis-
tributors either knew or should have known that there was a possibility that 
the timber they were importing was obtained after a bribe was paid to influ-
ence an act or decision of a foreign official, inducing such foreign official to 
violate a law in the timber’s country of origin (i.e. Peru, Brazil, Honduras) 
in order to secure an improper business advantage to obtain or retain busi-
ness.295 If indeed the companies have engaged in such conduct, it would 
constitute a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act anti-bribery pro-
visions.296 
The expansive reach of the FCPA makes it possible to reach illegal 
logging transactions in a variety of contexts. To illustrate, consider the fol-
lowing example: a United States timber importing corporation (“USTim-
ber”) imports timber from Peru. USTimber has received requests from the 
Peruvian timber exporter company (“PeruTimber”) for an unusual amount 
of discretionary money ($10,000) in its monthly budget request. A USTim-
ber employee goes to PeruTimber to discuss the request. PeruTimber keeps 
detailed financial records, but is unable to provide detailed information 
about how the discretionary funding is being spent. Upon questioning, the 
PeruTimber employee admits to the USTimber employee that the money is 
being spent on export fees although it is not listed as such on the budget 
report. The USTimber employee suspects that the money is being spent to 
get false documentation of illegal Peruvian mahogany, as USTimber has 
received consistent shipments of Peruvian mahogany, despite increasingly 
onerous regulations and supply shortages. The USTimber employee reports 
back to USTimber, which states that it will keep an eye on the situation, but 
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continues to do business with PeruTimber and takes no further action at that 
time. This situation somewhat resembles the conduct at issue in United 
States v. Labs of Virginia, where defendant, a United States laboratory, con-
tinued to import a shipment of monkeys knowing that they were violating 
Indonesian law.297 Under the FCPA, however, it is not necessary that de-
fendant United States corporations be aware of what specific local law they 
are violating, or the species of timber being illegally harvested, or any de-
tails of the bribe paid for false documents used to export the timber, in order 
for criminal liability to exist.298 
Small changes to the first example further demonstrate the FCPA’s 
reach. On the same facts as the first example, USTimber’s parent company 
(“USParent”) could be charged with an FCPA violation for the same con-
duct, even without any knowledge of the conduct.299 USTimber could still 
be charged on the same facts, where USTimber does not send an employee 
to speak with PeruTimber. USTimber is aware of the shortage of Peruvian 
mahogany, and the prevalence of bribes in the Peru forest sector, and prefers 
not to question how it is able to continue to import large quantities of Peru-
vian mahogany. Even without any direct awareness of bribes being paid to 
customs officials, USTimber—and USParent—could be charged with an 
FCPA violation.300  
Finally, consider the same facts involved in the first example, but with 
a Chinese company (“ChinaTimber”) importing shipments of Peruvian ma-
hogany from PeruTimber. Most of the business transactions between Chi-
naTimber and PeruTimber take place over the phone. One day, an employee 
from ChinaTimber is travelling in the United States for other legitimate 
business. While in the United States, ChinaTimber employee receives a 
phone call from a counterpart at PeruTimber to request additional funding 
for export fees. The ChinaTimber employee, suspecting, but not knowing, 
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that the additional funding will be used to bribe customs officials, agrees to 
provide the additional funding. This conduct, despite being between two 
foreign corporate entities, could also result in prosecution under the FCPA. 
ChinaTimber could be charged with a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3, 
which prohibits anyone from making “use of the mails or any means or in-
strumentality of interstate commerce.”301 
CONCLUSION 
No existing methods have worked to stop the cycle of illegal logging. 
The 2008 Lacey Act Amendments, which expanded the Lacey Act to in-
clude timber, have not yet proven successful. The Lacey Act’s negligence 
mens rea requirement, which requires importers to exercise “due care,” was 
developed through years of litigation in the illegal wildlife trafficking con-
text, and may not be easily transferable to the timber industry. Illegal log-
ging poses challenges not paralleled in the wildlife trafficking context, in-
cluding difficulty in definitively identifying timber by sight at inspection 
points. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”) treaty, which has proven to be somewhat 
successful in the wildlife trafficking context, is confined to species listed on 
the CITES appendices. Thus, charges of CITES violations would necessari-
ly require a definitive identification of the species of illegal timber being 
imported. 
As a leading importer of timber and wood products, the United States 
plays a central role in the transnational illegal logging industry. Illegal log-
ging causes significant and irreparable harms including deforestation, global 
warming, harm to indigenous communities, harm to the economies of coun-
tries where it takes place, and the permanent eradication of some species of 
timber. The Unites States has both the means and the tools necessary to inter-
rupt the cycle of illegal logging. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) 
can and should be used to combat illegal logging. By targeting the bribery 
that facilitates illegal logging around the world, use of the FCPA would cir-
cumvent the difficulties in pursuing Lacey Act or CITES prosecutions.  
The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions are broadly drafted and encompass 
a wide range of conduct. FCPA prosecutions would not necessitate detailed 
factual findings regarding the illegally harvested timber. Given the increase 
in FCPA prosecutions, and the emergence of new theories of FCPA liability, 
now is the time to expand the use of the FCPA to the realm of illegal log-
ging. 
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